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REPLEVIN OF THE CONTENTS OF SAFE DEPOSIT BOXES
It is often stated that a plaintiff cannot recover in replevin' or detinue
unless the defendant is in possession of the disputed goods at the commence-
ment of the action.2 This requirement is fundamentally one of practicality.
Since possession of the chattel is the primary object of an action for specific
recovery, replevin is inappropriate unless the defendant is in a position to
restore this possession to the plaintiff.3 But one may sometimes be able to
put another in possession and have a duty to do so without himself having
that combination of physical control and intent which the law calls posses-
sion.4 In such cases the practical reason for the requirement is satisfied, and
replevin has been held to be a proper remedy. Replevin will lie, for example,
against a servant (who has only custody of his master's goods),5 against a
bailor at whose order goods are held by another,0 and against an attaching
creditor who may at will release to the owner goods in the possession of the
sheriff.3 Thus, insofar as the character of the remedy is concerned, the re-
quirement that a defendant in replevin have "possession" means merely that
he must be able, without personally invading the rights of any person not a
party to the litigation, to put the plaintiff in physical custody of the goods.8
The defendant's position with respect to the chattel may be significant
for another reason, however. For the duty enforced in replevin is the duty
not to withhold possession from one entitled to it; and, while this obligation
1. "Replevin," as used in this Note, includes replevin in the detinet, detinue, claim
and delivery, bail-trover, and other similar actions for the recovery of specific personal
property.
2. E.g., Morrow v. Pryor, 125 Mo. App. 344, 102 S. W. 582 (1907); De Lore v.
Smith, 67 Ore. 304, 136 Pac. 13 (1913); SHIPMAN, COMMON-LAW PLEADING §§ 46, 51
(3d ed., Ballantine, 1923) ; see Note, 2 A. L. R. 2d 1043 (1948).
3. See Richards v. Morey, 133 Cal. 437, 65 Pac. 886, 887 (1901) ; Note, 18 L. R. A.
(N.s.) 1275 (1909).
4. "[A] person who is in 'possession of a chattel' is one who (a) has physical con-
trol of a chattel with the intent to exercise such control on his own behalf, or, otherwise
than as servant, on behalf of another. . . ." 1 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 216 (1934).
5. Eveleth v. Blossom, 20 Me. 447 (1867) ; Flatner v. Good, 35 Minn. 395, 29 N. W.
56 (1886) semble. Contra: McDougall v. Travis, 24 Hun 590 (N. Y. 1881).
6. Bradley v. Gamelle, 7 Minn. 331 (1862) ; Jones v. Green, 20 N. C. 488 (1839);
Krebs Hop Co. v. Taylor, 52 Ore. 627, 98 Pac. 494 (1908).
7. Taylor v. Bernheim, 58 Cal. App. 404, 209 Pac. 55 (1922); Allen v. Crary, 10
Wend. 349, 25 Am. Dec. 566 (N. Y. 1833). By the majority view, however, when the
sheriff is acting under valid legal process, goods so held are regarded as in the custody
of the law and beyond the control of the creditor. Grace v. Mitchell, 21 Wis. 533, 11 Am.
Rep. 613 (1872).
The action will also lie against a partner who refuses to allow the plaintiff to enter
land owned by the partnership and remove his machinery, Nelson v. Howison, 122 Ala.
573, 25 So. 211 (1899) (detinue), and against one who conspires with another to with-
hold plaintiff's bonds, even though the other conspirator has custody, see Meixell v.
Kirkpatrick, 33 Kin. 282, 6 Pac. 241 (1885).
8. "[W]here defendant has such control over the property that he may deliver the
possession of it if he so desires, replevin may be maintained against him, though he has
not actual manual possession." Burkee v. Great Northern Ry., 133 Minn. 200, 158 N. W.
41, 42 (1916) ; see Note, 18 L. R. A. (N.s.) 1275 (1909).
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may be voluntarily assumed, 9 it is imposed by law whenever the defendant's
physical control or proprietary rights become obstacles to the plaintiff's
possession. 10 For example, when A's goods, through his own fault and with-
out the knowledge or consent of B, are placed on B's land," an assertion of
B's right to exclude others from his premises actually operates to deprive A
of possession, and, unless privileged, 12 it violates this duty.13 But here again
legal possession would seem not to be the test ;14 the duty not to resist a tres-
pass arises, not because the defendant has possession, but because by such
action he would be withholding possession from the plaintiff.
Does a safe deposit company have such control over articles within its
vaults that it is in a position to deliver possession of them to their rightful
owner? And if so, does it have a non-contractual duty either to deliver them
or to permit one entitled to possession to enter its premises for the purpose
of taking possession?
Most courts have classified the relationship between a safe deposit com-
pany and its customers with respect to property placed in the rented compart-
ments as that of bailor and bailee for hire,15 finding that the general control
and supervision over the premises exercised by the company, coupled with
its intent to exclude all persons not entitled to access, 16 give the company both
actual and legal possession of property within its vaults.17 . A fortiori, the
9. As by a contract of bailment, which imposes a duty to deliver according to its
terms.
10. See 3 STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 155 (1906).
11. In such a situation A has no privilege to enter. McGill v. Holman, 28 Ala. 9,
93 So. 848 (1922) ; PROSSER, TORTS § 24 (1941) ; 1 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 200 (1934).
12. An intentional invasion of plaintiff's right to possession should be privileged only
if defendant's interest in preventing unauthorized entry on his land is much more important
than plaintiff's interest in the enjoyment of his chattels. See PROSSER, TORTS § 16 (1941) ;1 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 275, comment b (1934). The courts have tended to place a
premium on the right to exclusive possession of land. Chicago, I. & L. Ry. v. Pope, 99
Ind. App. 132, 188 N. E. 594 (1934), criticized, 9 IND. L. J. 461. But in any case de-
fendant cannot "exercise dominion" over the goods (i.e., sell them or use them for his
own benefit) and where no serious damage or inconvenience is threatened and the
value of the chattel is relatively great, the law should make it possible for the only
person who can make use of the chattel to regain its possession.
13. There is no logical inconsistency in the proposition that B may recover in tres-
pass for A's entry and yet himself be liable in trover if he takes affirmative steps toprevent it; each duty is separate and distinct. See 23 COL. L. REv. 312 (1923).
14. Thus, although no cases have been found, it would seem immaterial that the
chattel is on C's land, rather than B's, if A cannot recover it except by crossing B'sland. If C can defend against A, of course, then B's refusal would not in fact operate
to deprive A of the chattel and would violate no right of A.
15. E.g., National Safe Deposit Co. v. Stead, 250 Ill. 584, 95 N. E. 973 (1911), aff'd,232 U. S. 58, 34 Sup. Ct. 209, 58 L. Ed. 504 (1913) ; Lockwood v. Manhattan Storage
and Warehouse Co., 28 App. Div. 68, 50 N. Y. Supp. 974 (1st Dep't 1898); Young v.
First National Bank, 150 Tenn. 451, 265 S. W. 681 (1924) ; BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY§ 74 (1936); GODDARD, BAILMENTS AND CARRIERS § 158 (2d ed. 1928); 3 PATON'S
DIGEST 3300 (1944).
16. While "[p]ossession in law . . . has coupled with this concept [physical con-
trol] the idea of a legal claim and right to exercise it in one's own name against the
world at large" [POLLOCK AND WRIGHT, POSSESSION IN THE CooN LAW 1], "world
at large" is not inclusive of persons having a better legal right to possess. HOLMES,
THE Copmnox LAW 221 (1881).
17. See note 15 supra. By this analysis the depositor's key, like the key to a locked
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company is in a position to put the owner in possession; and, having volun-
tarily assumed possession of the chattels, 8 it has a duty to deliver this pos-
session to one entitled to it.19 A few courts, however, have ruled that a safe
deposit company merely leases space to its customers, collaterally contracting
to protect that space from unauthorized invasion.20 These courts reason that
neither in fact nor within the contemplation of the parties is there a delivery
of possession when property is placed in a compartment. 21 Rather possession
of the articles in a box, like possession of furniture in a rented office, is in the
lessee Of the space.22 Should this analysis change the result?
suitcase, is only an additional safeguard; its retention does not prevent a constructive
delivery of possession when articles are placed in a box. Cf. Hooper v. Day, 19 Me. 56,
36 Am. Dec. 734 (1841). This "bailment" classification has been criticized on the grounds
that it is inconsistent with the contract between the parties, actual control of the property,
and ordinary business understanding. DOBIE, BAILMENTS AND CtARiEu s § 67 (1914); 2
STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 291 (1906); VAN ZILE, BAILMENTS AND CAR-
RiERs § 195 (2d ed. 1908) ; Note, 11 MINN. L. REV. 440 (1927). The legal consequences,
of the relationship seem more nearly those of a bailment than of any other standard.
classification, however. HALE, BAILMENTS AND CARRiRs 250 (1896); 14 COL. L. REV.
345 (1914); 21 CorN. L. Q. 325 (1936); 34 YALE L. J. 795 (1925).
18. By the nature of its business it consents in advance to the transfer of possession.
19. The company must at least deliver such control as it exercises itself. Some courts,
have forced the company to break into the box at its own expense. West Cache Sugar
Co. v. Hendrickson, 56 Utah 327, 190 Pac. 946 (1920). But see Tillinghast v. Johnson,
34 R. I. 136 82 Atl. 788, 792 (1912). In any case it must allow the plaintiff or the
sheriff to do so. Carples v. Cumberland Coal & Iron Co., 240 N. Y. 187, 148 N. E. 185
(1925) ; Trainer v. Saunders, 270 Pa. 451, 113 Atl. 681 (1921), 70 U. OF PA. L. REV.
112 (1922).
20. Wells v. Cole, 194 Minn. 275, 260 N. W. 520 (1935), 3 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 147
(garnishment improper because bank not in possession) ; Du Pont v. Moore, 86 N. H.
254, 166 AtI. 417 (1933) (trustee process; same); Rose v. Union Savings Bank and'
Trust Co., 14 Ohio N. P. (w.s.) 143, 28 Ohio Dec. N. P. 399 (1913) (replevin action,
improper because bank not in possession, senible).
21. The depositor's key gives him control of the space as against the bank, and the
bank's key serves to protect the renter's possession. Du Pont v. Moore, 86 N. H. 254,
166 At1. 417 (1933).
22. "The relationship assumed is the same as that which exists where one' person
rents from another an apartment in a big apartment building .... In all such cases the
lessor retains control of the avenues of access. . . . [Y]et no one questions that the
renter . . . is in possession of the contents of the [apartment]. Control of the avenues.
of access does not give one possession." Wells v. Cole, 194 Minn. 275, 260 N. W. 520,
521 (1935) ; see 3 U. OF Cir. L. REV. 147 (1935).
A better approach would be to treat the relationship as sui gencris, as the courts.
have treated field warehousing and other similar fact situations. See Notes, 133 A. L. R.
209 (1941), 170 A. L. R. 1113 (1947) (departipent store leasing arrangements). In
practical effect this is the result reached by the New York decisions, which call the
relationship a bailment for some purposes [Roberts v. Stuyvesant Safe Deposit Co., 123
N. Y. 57, 25 N. E. 294 (1890) (liability for loss)], and a lease for others. See Carples
v. Cumberland Coal & Iron Co., 240 N. Y. 187, 148 N. E. 185 (1925) (attachment) ;
People ex rel. Glynn v. Mercantile Safe Deposit Co., 159 App. Div. 98, 143 N. Y. Supp.
849 (Ist Dep't 1913) (duty to report assets of a decedent to taxing authorities). And
some courts have expressly declined to classify the transaction, holding classification
unnecessary to the solution of the particular case. See National Safe Deposit Co. v.
Stead, 232 U. S. 58, 67, 34 Sup. Ct. 209, 58 L. Ed. 504 (1913) (statutory duty to report
box to taxing authorities held not a violation of due process); McDonald v. Win. D.
Perkins & Co., 133 Wash. 622, 234 Pac 456 (1925) (liability for negligent loss of con-
tents) ; Trowbridge v. Spinning, 23 Wash. 48, 62 Pac. 125 (1900) (garnishment).
As an abstract matter, probably the bank and the renter are in joint possession. See
Lamus v. Engwicht, 39 Cal. App. 523, 179, Pac. 435, 439 (1919) ; 1 PATON'S DIGEST 159
(1940); 3 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 147 (1935). But the nature of the proceeding must be
considered before it can be determined whether the bank is in "possession" as against third
parties. See Kocourek, Two Problems in Possession, 17 CALIF. L. REV. 372 (1929) (point-
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This problem was raised in Kohlsaat v. First National Bank of St.
Paul,23 a recent Minnesota decision. In this case testatrix died leaving trust
property in a safe deposit box in defendant bank. By her will plaintiff was
appointed successor trustee. Plaintiff presented the key and informed de-
fendant of her right to the contents of the box; but the bank, standing on the
terms of its rental contract, refused to allow anyone but the "legal repre-
sentative" 24 of testatrix to enter the box. Following Wells v. Cole,2 5 the
court found that the relationship between the bank and testatrix was that of
lessor and lessee and that possession of the rented space remained in testa-
trix and passed to her estate. It then reasoned that securities placed within
the box were not in the bank's possession, and therefore that no action for
their specific recovery could be directed against the bank.26
This conclusion seems unsound. Plaintiff could and would have taken
possession of the contents of the box had defendant granted her access to it.
Since she had testatrix's key and a privilege to invade the possession of testa-
trix's estate,27 defendant's interference was the sole obstacle to her possession.
Thus defendant could have put plaintiff into possession, and replevin was an
appropriate remedy.28 Defendant's unqualified refusal either to deliver the
bonds or to allow plaintiff access to the box, unless privileged, violated its
duty not to withhold possession from one entitled to it.29 Thus the real ques-
tion in the case is not whether defendant was in possession, but whether it
was privileged to deprive plaintiff of possession. And where, as here, the
ing out that a person may be a possessor as to A and merely a detentor as to B) ; Shartel,
Meanings of Possession, 16 MiNN. L. REV. 611 (1932). Thus a deposit company may be
held not to have the "possession and control" contemplated by a local garnishment
statute. Du Pont v. Moore, 86 N. H. 254, 166 Atl. 417 (1933), for example, must be
read in connection with Stickney v. Balchelder, 18 N. H. 40 (1845) (holdingthat T
,could not be garnisheed for shingles left in T's shed by D); cf. Wis. STAT. § 304.231
(1945) ("Property in a safe deposit box ... is not property in the possession or control
of such bank or safe deposit company within the meaning of [the chapter on attachment
and garnishment]"). Yet on the same facts it may have the control and intent necessary
to hold it as a possessor for other purposes. See Lamus v. Engwicht, 39 Cal. App. 523,
179 Pac. 435, 439 (1919).
23. 33 N. W. 2d 712 (Minn. 1948) (reversing a judgment which awarded the
plaintiff possession of the securities and $3,045 damages for their detention) ; cf. Rose v.
-Union Saving Bank and Trust Co.,'14 Ohio N. P. (N.s.) 143, 28 Ohio Dec. N. P. 399(1913).
24. The court held that plaintiff was not the "legal representative" of testatrix, and
therefore that the bank was under no contractual obligation to plainiff. 33 N. W. 2d
at 715.
25. 194 Minn. 275, 260 N. W. 520 (1935).
26. 33 N. W. 2d at 716.
27. This privilege is based on the implied consent of the transferor that the trans-
feree may enter to take possession. But cf. 1 RESTATEMENT, ToRTS § 181 second caveat(1934). Even without this privilege (i.e., even if entering the box would have amounted
to a technical trespass against testatrix's estate), however, since the estate evidenced
neither a desire nor an intention to resist her entry, defendant could have put it within
the power of plaintiff to remove the securities. See Trowbridge v. Spinning, 23 Wash.
48, 62 Pac. 125, 131 (1900).
28. See supra p. 686. Replevin will lie against a landlord who interferes with the
removal of goods from his tenant's premises. Eastern Outfitting Co. v. Myers, 39 Cal.
App. 316, 180 Pac. 669 (1918) ; Latimer v. Wheeler, 30 Barb. 485 (N. Y. 1859).
29. 1 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 237, comment e (1934).
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bank's interest in protecting its premises from this type of trespass is rela-
tively far less important than the social interest in protecting the enjoyment
of property by those entitled to its possession,"0 it would seem that no privi-
lege should be found.
BEVERLY DOUGLAS, JR.
30. The bank had a right to demand satisfactory proof of title, time to investigate,
reimbursement for damages occasioned by the entry, and indemnity against possible
liability; and it was entitled to interplead the renter. In view of the nature of its business,
this would seem fully to protect the bank's interests. The Kohlsaat case, on the other
hand, illustrates the inconvenience which may result from releasing the bank from all
non-contractual liability; for plaintiff must now proceed to sue testatrix's estate (for
which no administrator had been appointed), which has no real interest in or concern
with the controversy, in the meanwhile being deprived of the enjoyment of his property.
(The plaintiff had already suffered over $3,000 damages from the decline in value of
the securities in the box. See note 23 supra.)
